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B
ekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (BHL) are to
be congratulated for producing another
paper on equity market liberalizations in
emerging markets, and it is a pleasure to discuss
their work. Yet, there are three reasons why I may
not be an impartial discussant: (i) Having devoted
most of my fledgling career to the study of capital
account liberalization in emerging markets, I am
favorably disposed to the research topic; (ii) my
published work contains extensive citations to the
authors’ papers; and (iii) I am in broad agreement
with the lion’s share of the authors’ conclusions
about the effects of equity market liberalization
on the cost of capital.
The BHL paper has three central themes. First,
liberalization reduces the cost of capital. Second,
dating liberalizations is difficult and we should try
to do a better job of pinning down precise liberal-
ization dates. Third, and most importantly, the
liberalization-induced fall in the cost of capital
increases the growth rate of gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita by 1 percentage point per annum. 
I believe the first message. There is broad con-
sensus that liberalization reduces the cost of capital
by up to 100 basis points, depending on how you
date the liberalization (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000;
Henry, 2000a; Martell and Stulz, 2003; Stulz, 1999).
All of the evidence we have supports this qualitative
conclusion and suggests that the effects are economi-
cally significant, even if we can’t precisely pin down
the magnitude of the effects (Henry 2000b, 2003). 
I also believe the second message. Liberalizations
are difficult to date. While there is broad agreement
that liberalization reduces the cost of capital, there
is some disagreement about the exact timing of
liberalizations. This matters, in principle, because
the size of the effect depends on what liberalization
date one chooses. On the other hand, changing
liberalization dates has virtually no effect on the
qualitative conclusion that liberalization reduces
the cost of capital. Because more precise dates are
likely to strengthen our previous conclusions about
the financial effects of liberalization, and because
this is a conference on the real effects of finance,
most of my comments will be directed toward the
third message, which is summarized in Table 4 of
BHL’s paper—equity market liberalization increases
the growth rate of GDP per capita by 1 percent per
annum. 
I don’t believe the third message. The claim that
stock liberalizations increase the growth rate of GDP
per capita by 1 percent per annum is inconsistent
with the assumptions of the neoclassical growth
model on which the analysis is based. The rest of
my comments will be devoted to developing this
thought in detail, but, first, a small digression. 
The paper uses the terms “equity market liberal-
ization” and “financial liberalization” interchange-
ably. Doing so is potentially confusing. Financial
liberalization refers to the removal of domestic
financial repression—government-imposed interest
rate ceilings, restricted use of savings for consumer
credit purposes, and the like (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw,
1973). The McKinnon-Shaw literature studies the
effects of financial liberalization on interest rates
and growth, but financial liberalization, per se, has
nothing to do with granting foreigners access to
domestic capital markets.
In contrast, the BHL paper summarizes the
empirical effects of equity market liberalization, a
decision by a country’s government to allow for-
eigners to purchase shares in the domestic equity
market. Strictly speaking, equity market liberaliza-
tion is a specific type of capital account liberalization,
which is a decision to allow capital in all forms to
move freely in and out of the domestic market. In
other words, the distinction between financial lib-
eralization and capital account liberalization is worth
making because the two terms mean very different
things in the literature and none of the BHL results
have anything to do with financial liberalization in
the traditional sense. For the sake of clarity, I would
hold to the traditional nomenclature.
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LIBERALIZATION: COST OF CAPITAL
Back to the main issues. An emerging economy’s
cost of capital should fall when it liberalizes its equity
market. The following partial-equilibrium, mean
variance arguments based on Stulz (1999) make the
central points most succinctly.
Assume a small country whose equity market
is completely segmented from world equity markets.
Also assume that all investors in the world have the
same constant relative risk aversion and care about
only the expected return and variance of their invest-
ment. Let E[R ˜
M] denote the equilibrium required
rate of return on the aggregate domestic stock market
before liberalization, and let rf denote the domestic
risk-free interest rate. Define the price of risk as
follows: the aggregate risk premium, E[R ˜
M]–rf,
divided by the variance of the aggregate return on
the market, VAR (R ˜
M). Under our assumptions, the
price of risk in the small country before liberaliza-




Now consider what happens to the required rate
of return when the country opens its stock market
to the rest of the world and also allows its residents
to invest abroad. Assume that the mean and variance
of domestic dividends are unaltered by the liberaliza-
tion. Let E[R ˜*
M] denote the required rate of return
on the market after liberalization and let E[R ˜
W] be
the required rate of return on the world equity
market. With completely open capital markets, the
world risk-free rate, r* f, becomes the relevant interest
rate. The risk premium on the domestic stock mar-
ket will now depend on the following two factors:
(i) the beta of the domestic stock market with the
world stock market, βMW, and (ii) the world risk
premium, E[R ˜
W]–r* f. Following liberalization it must




Since the liberalizing country is small, adding
its stock market to the world market portfolio has a
negligible effect on the variance (and hence the risk
premium) of the world market portfolio. It follows
that (E[R ˜
W]–r* f)=TVAR(R ˜
W). Using this fact, the
definition of βMW, and a little bit of algebra, one
can show that after liberalization the required rate





Subtracting equation (1) from equation (3) gives
the difference in the post- and pre-liberalization
required rates of return:
(4)    ∆E[R ˜




Since poor countries have lower capital-to-labor
ratios than rich countries, we would expect that
rf>r* f. Hence the first term on the right-hand side
of (4) is negative. Next, consider the change in the
equity premium. For every country in the sample,
the covariance of the local market with the world
market, Cov(R ˜
M,R ˜
W), is less than the variance of
the local market, Var(R ˜
M) (Stulz, 1999). Hence the
second term is also negative. The central result fol-
lows: Liberalization reduces the cost of capital.
REAL EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZATION:
INVESTMENT AND GROWTH
Since liberalization reduces the cost of capital,
firms should engage in arbitrage between equities
and physical assets, as described by Fischer and
Merton (1984) and Tobin and Brainard (1977). The
Solow growth model illustrates the point (Solow,
1956). Before liberalization, the economy is in steady
state: The marginal product of capital equals the
cost of capital; the capital stock and the labor force
are growing at the same rate. Liberalization occurs
and the cost of capital falls. Firms respond by driv-
ing down the marginal product of capital to its new
lower cost. But marginal products and costs can be
equalized only if the capital stock temporarily grows
faster than the labor force. Hence, there must be
an increase in the growth rate of the capital stock
(investment). Once the marginal product of capital
falls to the post-liberalization cost of capital, the
growth rate of the capital stock will return to its pre-
liberalization rate (i.e., the same rate as the labor
force).
Since the growth rate of the capital stock
increases, the growth rate of output per worker
should also rise in accordance with the standard
growth accounting equation: 
(5) Y ˆ=A ˆ+αK ˆ+(1–α)L ˆ,
where a circumflex over a variable denotes the
change in the natural log of that variable.
76 JULY/AUGUST 2003
Henry R EVIEWEVIDENCE AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE
BHL FINDINGS ON LIBERALIZATION
AND GROWTH
With all of the theoretical pieces in place for
understanding the effects of liberalization, I now turn
to the raw data that form the basis of the central
BHL results. The sample of countries that I use in
my analysis consists of the countries and liberaliza-
tion dates reported in Table 1 of the BHL paper.
Figures 1 through 4 produce the basic evidence. 
Consistent with firms increasing investment in
response to a liberalization-induced fall in the cost
of capital, Figure 1 shows that the growth rate of the
capital stock rises in the aftermath of liberalizations.
To give a rough sense of magnitudes, I use the data
presented in Figure 1 to calculate the average growth
rate in the five-year period preceding the liberaliza-
tion (years –5 through –1) and the average growth
rate in the five-year period following the liberaliza-
tion (years 1 through 5).1 This calculation reveals
that the growth rate of the capital stock increases
by 0.9 percentage points—from an average of 4.0
percent per year in the pre-liberalization period to
an average of 4.9 percent in the post-liberalization
period.
Figure 2 confirms that the growth rate of out-
put per worker rises by 1.0 percentage points—
from an average of 1.2 percent per year in the
pre-liberalization period to an average of 2.2 percent
per year in the post-liberalization period. On the
one hand, there is nothing surprising about Figure 2.
Whereas Figure 1 documents a behavioral response
of the quantity of capital to liberalization, Figure 2
simply provides a mechanical check of the standard
growth accounting equation (5).
On the other hand, Figure 2 is interesting in
that the increase in the growth rate of output per
worker is too large to be explained by the increase
in the growth rate of the capital stock. A few simple
calculations illustrate the point. The elasticity of
output with respect to capital, α, is typically around
0.33. So, based on Figure 1, we would expect the
growth rate of output per worker in the post-
liberalization period to be about 0.297 (0.33 times
0.9) percentage points higher. But Figure 2 displays
a 1.0-percentage-point increase in the growth rate
of output per worker.
All else equal, a 0.9-percentage-point increase
in the growth rate of the capital stock can produce
a 1.0-percentage-point increase in the growth rate
of output per worker only if the elasticity of output
with respect to capital is slightly larger than 1! In
their NBER working paper on liberalization and
growth, the authors find that the increase in growth
due to liberalization is slightly larger than 1 percent-
age point, even after controlling for a number of
variables (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2001).
There are two possible explanations of such a
result. Either (i) capital accumulation in emerging
markets is characterized by increasing returns or
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1 All before-and-after growth rates quoted for Figures 2 through 4 are
based on analogous calculations.
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Figure 2(ii) the BHL estimates of the effect of liberalization
on growth are overstated. I think the BHL estimates
of the effect of liberalization on growth are over-
stated because they fail to properly account for the
effect of increases in total factor productivity (TFP)
growth that closely coincide with stock market
liberalizations, but are not a result of the stock
market liberalizations per se. Let me explain.
Equation (5) shows that any increase in the rate
of growth of output that is not accounted for by an
increase in the growth rate of capital and labor must
be the result of an increase in A ˆ, the growth rate of
TFP. So, one way to rationalize the BHL results is to
claim that, in addition to increasing investment,
stock market liberalizations also drive up TFP growth.
However, it is important to remember that the theory
of capital account liberalization focuses exclusively
on capital accumulation. Technological change and
TFP growth do not enter into the story. Therefore,
one cannot automatically claim that liberalization
is also responsible for the increase in TFP growth. 
Now, it is true that if liberalization increases
the allocative efficiency of domestic investment, it
will also raise TFP growth without any need for
technological change. However, it is not obvious
why capital account liberalization, a policy change
directed at increasing international allocative effi-
ciency, would have any effect on domestic alloca-
tive efficiency (Henry, 2003). But if equity market
liberalization is not responsible for the increase in
TFP growth, what is?
The simple answer is that other economic
reforms are at work. Indeed, stock market liberal-
izations are part of a general process that involves
substantial macroeconomic reforms such as inflation
stabilization and trade liberalization. While we typ-
ically interpret A ˆ as the growth rate of technological
progress, any economic reform that raises the effi-
ciency of a given stock of capital and labor will also
increase A ˆ, even in the absence of technological
change. In other words, holding the productivity
of capital constant, liberalization reduces the cost
of capital and encourages more rapid investment;
holding capital account policy constant, economic
reforms raise the marginal product of capital.
Because liberalizations do not occur in isolation, it
is important to think carefully about how to inter-
pret the data. 
Now the authors certainly acknowledge the
importance of other economic reforms. The paper
contains a lot of tables and lists of reforms and dis-
cusses the importance of thinking about those
reforms. But those events are not employed in their
analysis of liberalization on growth (BHL, 2001). 
The authors perform panel regressions of
country growth rates on a liberalization dummy
(Table 4 of the paper summarizes the results), but
they do not include dummy variables for the other
reforms, which they so painstakingly list in Table 3.
For example, in place of a discrete dummy variable
for trade reform that would tell us whether growth
increases following trade reforms, they use a con-
tinuous proxy variable—trade as a fraction of GDP.
They follow a similar approach with respect to infla-
tion stabilization. I do not understand this asym-
metric treatment of the economic reforms. If you
are performing a before-and-after experiment of
equity market liberalizations on growth, it seems
natural to perform a before-and-after experiment
for the other reforms on growth as well. 
Since the other economic reforms never enter
the empirical specifications in the same manner as
the equity market liberalizations, it is not clear how
much confidence we can place in the authors’ claim
that their estimated effect of equity market liberal-
ization on growth—1 percentage point per annum—
is robust to other reforms. I have already argued
that this claim is inconsistent with standard pro-
duction theory. I have also argued that this incon-
sistency cannot be easily reconciled by claiming
that liberalization increases TFP growth. Therefore,
the sensible conclusion is, contrary to the authors’
claim, that their estimate is not robust to the inclu-
sion of other reforms. Let me now illustrate the
point empirically with a few simple pictures. 
Standard trade theory predicts that trade liberal-
ization will increase TFP. As countries tilt produc-
tion toward their comparative advantage, they will
experience an increase in output, for a given stock
of capital and labor. Figure 3 plots the average growth
rate of output per worker across all of the countries
in the BHL sample following trade liberalizations.
The trade liberalization dates are taken from Sachs
and Warner (1995). The figure shows that the aver-
age growth rate of output per worker rises by 1.5
percentage points following trade liberalizations—
from an average of 0.6 percent per year in the five
years preceding trade liberalization to an average
of 2.1 percent per year in the five years after.
Stabilizing inflation may also increase TFP,
because high inflation generates incentives for
workers and producers to divert resources away
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toward activities that help them avoid the costs of
high inflation. There is an extensive literature that
demonstrates that stabilizing high inflation is good
for asset prices, investment, and output (Henry
2000b, 2002; Fischer, Sahay, and Végh, 2002; Calvo
and Végh, 1999; Easterly, 1996). 
Figure 4 plots the average growth rate of output
per worker across all of the countries in the BHL
sample following inflation stabilization programs.
The inflation stabilization dates are taken from
Henry (2002). In countries where there are multiple
stabilization dates, the last stabilization date was
chosen. Figure 4 shows that the growth rate of out-
put per worker rises by 0.8 percentage points follow-
ing stabilization programs—from an average of 0.8
percent per year in the five years preceding stabiliza-
tion to an average of 1.6 percent per year in the five-
year post-liberalization period.
Pictures are of course not conclusive. One would
also want to conduct some serious econometric
exercise that attempts to disentangle the effects of
these and other reforms on growth. My only point
is that there are strong a priori theoretical reasons
to expect reforms other than equity market liberal-
ization to have a significant effect on economic
growth. The raw data do no harm to this view and
provide strong prima facie evidence that the BHL
analysis significantly overstates the effect of equity
market liberalization on growth.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The problems with the BHL findings on equity
market liberalization and growth are not unique.
Interpretation problems are endemic to cross-
country growth regressions. Whatever growth in
output is not explained by growth in inputs is, by
definition, a result of TFP growth. Without a clean
theoretical link between TFP growth and equity
market liberalization, however, it is not clear how
to interpret the results. Nevertheless, the authors
deserve credit for tackling an important question.
We certainly need a better understanding of the
ways in which the effects of liberalization are trans-
mitted to the real economy, but the results on equity
market liberalization and growth are difficult to
believe. I look forward to reading their future efforts
at sorting out these difficult but important issues.
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